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Secure Quantum Network Code without Classical
Communication
Seunghoan Song and Masahito Hayashi, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the secure quantum communication
over a network with the presence of a malicious adversary
who can eavesdrop and contaminate the states. The network
consists of noiseless quantum channels with the unit capacity
and the nodes which applies noiseless quantum operations. As
the main result, when the maximum number m1 of the attacked
channels over the entire network uses is less than a half of
the network transmission rate m0 (i.e., m1 < m0/2), our code
implements secret and correctable quantum communication of
the rate m0 − 2m1 by using the network asymptotic number
of times. Our code is universal in the sense that the code is
constructed without the knowledge of the specific node operations
and the network topology, but instead, every node operation is
constrained to the application of an invertible matrix to the basis
states. Moreover, our code requires no classical communication.
Our code can be thought of as a generalization of the quantum
secret sharing.
Index Terms—quantum network code, quantum error-
correction, CSS code, universal construction, malicious adver-
sary.
I. INTRODUCTION
N
ETWORK coding is a coding method, addressed first by
Ahlswede et al. [1], that allows network nodes to ma-
nipulate information packets before forwarding. As a quantum
analog, quantum network coding considers sending quantum
states through a network which consists of noiseless quantum
channels and nodes performing quantum operations. Since it
was first discussed by Hayashi et al. [2], many other papers
[3]–[9] have studied quantum network codes.
Classical network codes with security have been studied by
two different methods. One method is to combine the network
node controls and an end-to-end code. In this method, the
sender and receiver know the network topology, control the
node operations, and construct an end-to-end code between
them. The use of the end-to-end code is important because it
generates the redundancy which is necessary for the security
guarantee. By this method, Cai and Yeung [10] first devised
a classical network code which guarantees the secrecy of the
communication. Secure classical network codes by this method
have been further studied in [11], [12].
The other method for secure classical network codes is
to use only an end-to-end code without controlling node
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operations. In this method, the node operations are not di-
rectly controlled but constrained, and an end-to-end code is
constructed with the knowledge of the constraints without
specific knowledge of the underlying node operations and
the network topology. Although the codes [13]–[16] by this
method do not control the node operations, which differs from
the original definition of the network code in [1], these codes
are also called network codes. By this method, Jaggi et al.
[13] constructed a classical network code with asymptotic
error correctability. In the paper [13], all node operations
are not controlled but constrained to be linear operations,
and the code is universal in the sense that the code is
constructed independently of the network topology and the
particular node operations. When the transmission rate m0
of the network and the maximum rate m1 of the malicious
injection satisfy m1 < m0, the code in [13] achieves the
correctability with the rate m0 − m1 by asymptotic n uses
of the network. Furthermore, Hayashi et al. [16] extended the
result in [13] so that the secrecy is also guaranteed: when
previously defined m0, m1, and the information leakage rate
m2 satisfy m1 + m2 < m0, the classical network code in
[16] achieves the secrecy and the correctability with the rate
m0 −m1 −m2 by asymptotic n uses of the network.
On the other hand, secure quantum network codes have been
designed by Owari et al. [8] and Kato et al. [9]. However, the
codes in [8], [9] only keep secrecy from the malicious adver-
sary but do not guarantee the correctness of the transmitted
state if there is an attack. Moreover, this code depends on the
network topology and requires classical communication.
In this paper, to resolve these problems and as a natural
quantum extension of the secure classical network codes [13],
[16], we present a quantum network code which is secret and
correctable. Since we take a similar method to [13], [16],
our code consists only of an end-to-end code without node
operation controls and transmits a state by multiple n uses of
the quantum network. When the network transmission rate is
m0 and the maximum number m1 of the attacked channels
satisfy m1 < m0/2, our code transmits quantum information
of the rate m0 − 2m1 with high fidelity by asymptotic n
uses of the network. Since the high fidelity of the transmitted
quantum state guarantees the secrecy of the transmission [17],
the secrecy of our code is guaranteed.
There are several notable properties in our code. First, our
code is universal in the sense that the code construction does
not depend on the network topology and the particular node
operations. Instead, we place two constraints on the network
topology and node operations. That is, at every node, the
number of incoming edges is the same as the number of
2outgoing edges, and, similarly to [13], [16] but differently
from [8], [9], every node operation is the application of an
invertible matrix to basis states. Then, our code is constructed
by using the constraints but without any knowledge of the
network topology and operations. Secondly, our code can
be constructed without any classical communication. Though
a negligible rate secret shared randomness is necessary for
our code construction, we attach a subprotocol in order for
sharing the randomness by use of the quantum network, and
therefore no classical communication or no assumption of
shared randomness is needed. Thirdly, our code is secure from
any malicious operation on m1 channels if m1 < m0/2. That
is, when m1 < m0/2, our code is secure from the strongest
eavesdropper who knows the network topology and the net-
work operations, keeps classical information extracted from
the wiretapped states, and applies quantum operations on the
attacking channels adaptively by her wiretapped information.
Fourthly, when the network consists of parallel m0 quantum
channels, our code can be thought of as an error-tolerant
quantum secret sharing [18].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II formally describes the quantum network and the attack
model. Section III presents two main results of the paper,
and compares our quantum network code with the quantum
maximum distance separable (MDS) codes and quantum secret
sharing. Based on the preliminaries in Section IV, Section
V constructs our code when a negligible rate secret shared
randomness is assumed. Section VI evaluates the performance
of the code and shows that the entanglement fidelity of the
code protocol is bounded by the sum of two error probabilities,
called bit error probability and phase error probability. Section
VII derives upper bounds of the bit error probability and
phase error probability, respectively. Section VIII constructs
our code without assuming any negligible rate secret shared
randomness. Section IX analyzes the secrecy of our code.
Section X is the conclusion of the paper.
II. QUANTUM NETWORK AND ATTACK MODEL
We give the formal description of our quantum network
which is defined as a natural quantum extension of a classical
network. The notations in the network and attack model are
summarized in Table I, and an example of the quantum
network is given in Fig. 1.
A. Network structure and transmission
We consider the network described by a directed acyclic
graph Gm0 = (V,E) where V is the set of nodes (vertices)
and E is the set of channels (edges). The networkGm0 has one
source node v0, intermediate nodes v1, . . . , vc (c := |V | − 2),
and one sink node vc+1, where the subscript represents the
order of the information conversion. The source node v0 and
the sink node vc+1 have m0 outgoing and incoming channels,
respectively, and each intermediate node vt has the same
number kt ∈ {1, . . . ,m0} of incoming and outgoing channels.
For convenience, we define k0 = kc+1 := m0.
The transmission on the network Gm0 is described as
follows. Each channel transmits information noiselessly unless
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
m0 Network transmission rate without attack
m1 (< m0/2) Maximum number of attacked channels
ma (≤ m1) Number of attacked channels
H Unit quantum system
q Dimension of H (prime power)
n Block-length
F Network structure
Sn Strategy of malicious attack
Γ[Fn, Sn] Network operation
Cn Quantum network code
H
(n)
code Code space
Λn = Λ[Cn,Fn, Sn] Averaged protocol by code randomness
H′ Extended unit quantum system
α Dimension of extension
q′ = qα Dimension of H′
n′ Block-length with respect to H′
|x〉b (x ∈ Fq (Fq′ )) Bit basis element of H (H
′)
|z〉p (z ∈ Fq (Fq′ )) Phase basis element of H (H
′)
the channel is attacked, and each node applies an information
conversion noiselessly at any time. At time 0, the source node
transmits the input information along the m0 outgoing chan-
nels. At time t ∈ {1, . . . , c}, the node vt applies an information
conversion to the information from the kt incoming channels,
and outputs the conversion outcome along the kt outgoing
channels. At time c + 1, the sink node receives the output
information from the m0 incoming channels. The detailed
constraints of the transmitted information and information
conversion are described in the following subsections.
The m0 outgoing channels of the source node are numbered
from 1 to m0, and after the conversion in the node vt, the
assigned numbers are changed from kt incoming channels to
kt outgoing channels deterministically.
B. Classical network
To explain our model of the quantum network, we first
consider the classical network. Every single use of a channel
transmits one symbol of the finite field Fq of order q. Hence,
the information at each time is described by the vector space
F
m0
q . We assume that the information conversion at each
intermediate node is an invertible linear operation. That is,
the information conversion at each intermediate node vt is
written as an invertible kt × kt matrix At acting only on the
kt components of the vector space F
m0
q . Therefore, combining
all the conversions, the relation between the input information
x ∈ Fm0q and the output information y ∈ Fm0q can be
characterized by an invertible m0 ×m0 matrix K as
y = Kx. (1)
We extend the above discussion to the case of n network
uses, i.e., the input and output informations are written as X =
[x1, . . . , xn] ∈ Fm0×nq and Y = [y1, . . . , yn] ∈ Fm0×nq . We
assume that every intermediate node vt applies the invertible
matrix At at n times and the matrix At is not changed during
the n transmissions. In addition, we assume that the inputs
3v0
Source
v1
L(A1)
v2
L(A2)
v3
L(A3)
v4
Target
A1 =
[
1 3
2 3
]
, A2 =

1 2 30 1 5
5 6 0

 , A3 =

0 2 21 1 1
0 1 2

 .
Fig. 1. Quantum network with three intermediate nodes. Source and sink
nodes have m0 = 6 outgoing and incoming channels, respectively, and each
intermediate node has the same number of incoming and outgoing channels.
Each channel transmits 7-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e., q = 7, and each
intermediate node vt for t = 1, 2, 3 applies L(At), where At is an invertible
matrix over F7.
v0
Source
v1
L(A1)
v2
L(A2)
v3
L(A3)
v4
Target
Attack
Fig. 2. Propagation of malicious corruption in quantum network of Fig. 1
when Eve attacks the first channel (zigzagged) of the source node. The
malicious corruption propagates by node operations along dashed channels.
The target node receives 5 corrupted unit quantum systems.
x1, . . . , xn are independently transmitted, i.e., yi = Kxi holds
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, we have the relation
Y = KX. (2)
Next, we extend more to the case where a malicious
adversary Eve attacks ma (≤ m1) channels, i.e., fixed ma
channels are attacked over n uses of the network (Fig. 2).
Since all the node operations are linear, there is a linear
relation between the information on each channel and output
information. That is, there arema vectorsw1, . . . , wma in F
m0
q
satisfying the following condition: when Eve adds the noise
z1, . . . , zma ∈ Fnq on the ma attacked channels, the relation
(2) is changed to
Y = KX +
ma∑
j=1
wjz
⊤
j = KX +WZ, (3)
whereW = [w1, . . . , wma ] and Z = [z1, . . . , zma ]
⊤. Here, the
vectors w1, . . . , wma are determined by the network topology
and node operations. For the detail, see [9, Section 2.2]. Even
in the case where Eve chooses the noise Z dependently of
the input information X , the output information Y is always
written in the form (3).
C. Quantum network
We consider a natural quantum extension of the above
classical network. Every single use of a quantum channel
transmits a quantum system H of dimension q spanned by
a basis {|x〉b | x ∈ Fq} which is called the bit basis. In
n uses of the network, the whole system to be transmitted
is written as H⊗m0×n spanned by {|X〉b | X ∈ Fm0×nq }.
To describe the node operations, we introduce the following
unitary operations: for an invertible m×m matrix A and an
invertible n × n matrix B, two unitaries L(A) and R(B) are
defined as
L(A) :=
∑
X∈Fm×nq
|AX〉bb〈X |, R(B) :=
∑
X∈Fm×nq
|XB〉bb〈X |. (4)
Every node vt converts the information on the subsystem
H⊗kt×n by applying the unitary L(At). If there is no attack,
the operation of the whole network is the application of the
unitary L(K).
Next, we introduce Eve’s attack model. Eve attacks fixed
ma (≤ m1) channels over n uses of the network. Whenever
quantum systems are transmitted over the ma attacked chan-
nels, Eve can perform on the systems any trace preserving
and completely positive (TP-CP) maps, measurements defined
by positive operator-valued measure (POVM), or both. We
assume that Eve’s operations can be adaptive on the previous
measurement outcomes and Eve knows the network topology
and all node operations.
Consider the entire network operation with malicious at-
tacks. When Eve attacks on channels, the network structure
F is characterized by the network topology Gm0 = (V,E),
node operations A = (A1, . . . , Ac), and the set Eatt ⊂ E of
attacked channels, i.e., F := (Gm0 , A,Eatt). Given a network
structure F , Eve’s strategy Sn over n network uses determines
the TP-CP map of the entire network operation. Therefore, we
denote the entire network operation over n network uses as a
TP-CP map
Γ[Fn, Sn], (5)
where Fn denotes the network structure F is used n times.
As a special case, if Eatt = ∅, we have Γ[Fn, Sn] =
L(K)ρL(K)†. Moreover, we define the set ζ
(n)
m0,m1 of all
network structures and strategies of transmission rate m0
without attacks, at most m1 attacked channels, and block-
length n as
ζ(n)m0,m1
:= {(F , Sn) | F = (Gm0 , A,Eatt), ma= |Eatt|≤m1}. (6)
4Quantum Network with
Invertible Linear Operations
Encoder
(Private Randomness Re)
Decoderρ ∈S(H
(n)
code) D
(n)
Rs
(σ)∈S(H
(n)
code)
(Shared Randomness Rs)
E
(n)
Rs,Re
(ρ)∈S(H⊗m0×n) σ∈S(H⊗m0×n)
Evechannel attack
Fig. 3. Protocol with negligible rate secret shared randomness. S(H) denotes the set of density matrices on the Hilbert space H.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the two coding theorems with
and without a negligible rate secret shared randomness. For
any quantum network described in Section II, our code can be
constructed only with the knowledge of m0, m1, and q, but
without any specific knowledge of the node operations L(At)
and the network topology Gm0 .
A. Main idea in our code construction
In order to explain the main idea of our code, we briefly
introduce the classical network codes in [13], [16]. In [13],
[16], node operations are restricted to be linear operations.
Therefore, malicious injections on channels form a subspace
in the network output, in the same way as (3). Then, the
codes in [13], [16] find the subspace of injections from the
network output with the help of secret shared randomness
between the sender and receiver. Finally, the codes recover
the original message from the information not in the subspace
of injections.
By the above method of the classical network codes in
[13], [16], our quantum network code is designed in the
following way. Since our quantum network in Section II
is defined as a natural quantum extension of the classical
networks in [13], [16], we can reduce the correctness of
our code to that of two classical network codes which are
defined on two bases of quantum systems (in Sections VI
and VII-B). In this reduction, our quantum network code is
sophisticatedly defined so that the two classical network codes
are similar to the codes in [13], [16]. A difficult point in our
code construction is that the accessible information from the
network output state is restricted since a measurement disturbs
the quantum states, whereas the classical network codes [13],
[16] have access to all information of the network output. Our
code circumvents this difficulty by attaching to the codeword
the ancilla whose measurement outcome contains sufficient
information for finding the subspace of injections.
B. Main theorems
In this subsection, we present two coding theorems with
and without a negligible rate secret shared randomness.
Before we state the two coding theorems, we formulate a
quantum network code of block-length n. Let Rs and Re
be sets for the secret shared randomness and the private
randomness parameters, respectively. Let H(n)code be a quantum
system called the code space. Given (rs, re) ∈ Rs × Re,
an encoder is defined as a TP-CP map E
(n)
rs,re from H(n)code to
H⊗m0×n, and a decoder is defined as a TP-CP map D(n)rs
from H⊗m0×n to H(n)code. The parameter rs is assumed to be
shared between the encoder and decoder but kept a secret to
all others, and re is a private randomnesses of the encoder.
Then, a quantum network code is defined as
Cn := {(E(n)rs,re ,D(n)rs ) | (rs, re) ∈ Rs ×Re}. (7)
In order to evaluate the performance of a quantum network
code Cn, we consider the averaged protocol
Λ[Cn,Fn, Sn](ρ)
:=
1
|Rs ×Re|
∑
(rs,re)
D
(n)
rs ◦ Γ[Fn, Sn] ◦ E(n)rs,re(ρ), (8)
where the sum is taken in the set Rs × Re. If there is no
confusion, we denote Λ[Cn,Fn, Sn] by Λn. Then, the correct-
ness and secrecy of the code is evaluated by the entanglement
fidelity
F 2e (ρmix,Λn) := 〈Φ|Λn ⊗ ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)|Φ〉 (9)
of the completely mixed state ρmix on H(n)code and the averaged
protocol Λ[Cn,Fn, Sn], where |Φ〉 is the maximally entangled
state and ιR is the identity operator on the reference system.
Theorem III.1 (Quantum Network Code with Negligible Rate
Secret Shared Randomness). Suppose that the sender and
receiver can share any secret randomness of negligible size in
comparison with the block-length. When m1 < m0/2, there
exist a sequence {nℓ}∞ℓ=1 with nℓ → ∞ as l → ∞ and a
sequence {Cnℓ}∞ℓ=1 of quantum network codes of block-lengths
nℓ such that
lim
ℓ→∞
|Rs|
nℓ
= 0, (10)
lim
ℓ→∞
logq dimH(nℓ)code
nℓ
= m0 − 2m1, (11)
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COMPARISON OF QUANTUM CODES FORm0 PARALLEL CHANNELS
Quantum MDS code [19] Our code
Use of network one-shot asymptotically many
Error probability zero-error vanishing error
Range of m1 m1 < m0/4 m1 < m0/2
Rate m0 − 4m1 m0 − 2m1
m0: number of parallel channels.
m1: maximum number of corrupted channels.
lim
ℓ→∞
max
(F ,Snℓ)
nℓ(1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ)) = 0, (12)
where Λnℓ := Λ[Cnℓ ,Fnℓ , Snℓ ], and the maximum is taken
with respect to (F , Snℓ) in ζ(nℓ)m0,m1 which is defined in (6).
Notice that this code depends only on the rates m0 and
m1, and does not depend on the detailed structure F of the
network. Section V gives the code realizing the performance
mentioned in Theorem III.1. Sections VI and VII prove that
the code in Section V satisfies the performance mentioned
in Theorem III.1. Section IX shows that the condition (12)
implies the secrecy of the code, by using the result of [17].
Indeed, it is known that there exists a classical network
code which transmits classical information securely when the
number of attacked channels is less than a half of the transmis-
sion rate from the sender to the receiver [15]. Although Theo-
rem III.1 requires secure transmission of classical information
with negligible rate in order for shared randomness, the result
[15] implies that such secure transmission can be realized
by using our quantum network in bit basis states with the
negligible number of times. Hence, as shown in Section VIII,
the combination of the result [15] and Theorem III.1 yields
the following theorem.
Theorem III.2 (Quantum Network Code without Classical
Communication). When m1 < m0/2, there exist a sequence
{nℓ}∞ℓ=1 with nℓ → ∞ as l → ∞ and a sequence {Cnℓ}∞ℓ=1
of quantum network codes of block-lengths nℓ such that
|Rs| = 0, (13)
lim
ℓ→∞
logq dimH(nℓ)code
nℓ
= m0 − 2m1, (14)
lim
ℓ→∞
max
(F ,Snℓ)
nℓ(1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ)) = 0, (15)
where Λnℓ := Λ[Cnℓ ,Fnℓ , Snℓ ], and the maximum is taken
with respect to (F , Snℓ) in ζ(nℓ)m0,m1 which is defined in (6).
C. Comparison our code with quantum error-correcting code
and quantum secret sharing
To compare with existing results, we consider the special
case where the network consists of m0 parallel channels. The
quantum maximum distance separable (MDS) code [19] of
length m0 works in this network even for the one-shot setting
which means one use of the network. When m1 < m0/4
and at most m1 channels are corrupted, the code has the rate
m0 − 4m1 and the error is zero. On the other hand, our code
works with n uses of the same network, and the position of
m1 corrupted channels is assumed to be fixed over all network
uses. Then, when m1 < m0/2 and at most m1 channels are
corrupted, our code has the rate m0− 2m1 and the error goes
to zero as the number n of network use goes to infinity.
On the other hand, our code has an advantage that it can
be used in any networks defined in Section II without any
modification of the code, whereas the quantum MDS code
[19] works only in the network with m0 parallel channels.
Our code applied for m0 parallel channels can be thought
of as an error-tolerant quantum secret sharing [18]. In error-
tolerant quantum secret sharing, a sender encodes a secret to
m0 shares and distributes the shares to m0 players, and all
players send their shares to the receiver. If m0 −m1 players
are honest, even if the other m1 players send maliciously
corrupted shares, the receiver can recover the secret and
the secret is not leaked to the malicious players. Our code
implements this task if the majority of players are honest, i.e.,
m1 < m0/2, which is the same for the error-tolerant quantum
secret sharing scheme in [18].
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we prepare definitions and notations which
are necessary for our code construction in Section V. In the
remainder of this paper, we assume ma ≤ m1 < m0/2.
A. Phase basis
Let q = st for a prime number s and a positive integer t.
In the construction of our code, we will discuss operations on
the phase basis {|z〉p}z∈Fq which is defined as [20, Section
8.1.2]
|z〉p := 1√
q
∑
x∈Fq
ω− tr(xz)|x〉b
for ω := exp(2πi/s) and tr y := TrMy (∀y ∈ Fq). Here,
the matrix My ∈ Ft×ts is the multiplication matrix x ∈ Fq 7→
yx ∈ Fq where the finite field Fq is identified with the vector
space Fts.
The following Lemma IV.1 describes the application of the
unitaries L(A) and R(A), defined in (4), to the phase basis
states, and is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma IV.1. For any Z ∈ Fm×nq and any invertible matrices
A ∈ Fm×mq and B ∈ Fn×nq , we have
L(A)|Z〉p = |(A⊤)−1Z〉p, R(B)|Z〉p = |Z(B⊤)−1〉p. (16)
For convenience, we use notation [A]p := (A
−1)⊤ =
(A⊤)−1 for any invertible matrix A.
B. Block-lengths and extended quantum system in our code
First, we define the sequence {nℓ}∞ℓ=1 of block-lengths. For
any positive integer ℓ, define four parameters
αℓ := max{
⌊
5 logq ℓ
⌋
, 1}, n′ℓ :=
⌊
ℓ
αℓ
⌋
,
nℓ := αℓn
′
ℓ, q
′ := qαℓ . (17)
6Then, we have
lim
ℓ→∞
nℓ · (n′ℓ)m0
(q′)m0−m1
= 0, (18)
because
nℓ · (n′ℓ)m0
(q′)m0−m1
≤ ℓ
1+m0
q(5 logq ℓ−1)(m0−m1)
≤ ℓ
1+5m1−4m0
qm1−m0
≤ ℓ
1−1.5m0
qm1−m0
→ 0.
In the following, we construct our code only for any suffi-
ciently large ℓ such that the condition
n′ℓ ≥ 3m0 (19)
holds, which is enough to discuss the asymptotic performance
of the code.
In our code, an extended quantum system H′ := H⊗αℓ is
the unit quantum system for encoding and decoding opera-
tions. We identify the system H′ with the system spanned by
{|x〉b | x ∈ Fq′}. Then, nℓ uses of the network over H can
be regarded as n′ℓ uses of the network over H′. For invertible
matrices A ∈ Fm×mq′ and B ∈ Fn×nq′ , two unitaries L′(A) and
R′(B) are defined, similarly to (4), as
L
′(A) :=
∑
X∈Fm×n
q′
|AX〉bb〈X |, R′(B) :=
∑
X∈Fm×n
q′
|XB〉bb〈X |,
and similarly to Lemma IV.1, for any Z ∈ Fm×nq′ , we have
L
′(A)|Z〉p = |(A⊤)−1Z〉p, R′(B)|Z〉p = |Z(B⊤)−1〉p.
C. Notations for quantum systems and states
In this subsection, we introduce several notations for quan-
tum states and systems. For the quantum system H⊗m0×nℓ =
(H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ which is transmitted by nℓ uses of the network,
we use the following notation:
(H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ= H′A ⊗H′B ⊗H′C
:= (H′)⊗m0×m0⊗(H′)⊗m0×m0⊗(H′)⊗m0×(n′ℓ−2m0).
Moreover, for any X ∈ {A,B, C} and (mA,mB,mC) :=
(m0,m0, n
′
ℓ − 2m0), we denote
H′X = H′X1 ⊗H′X2 ⊗H′X3
:= (H′)⊗m1×mX ⊗ (H′)⊗(m0−2m1)×mX ⊗ (H′)⊗m1×mX .
The tensor product state of |φ〉 ∈ H′X1, |ψ〉 ∈ H′X2, and |ϕ〉 ∈
H′X3 is denoted as
|φ〉|ψ〉
|ϕ〉

 := |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ⊗ |ϕ〉 ∈ H′X .
For any block matrix [X⊤, Y ⊤, Z⊤]⊤ ∈ Fm1×mXq ×
F
(m0−2m1)×mX
q × Fm1×mXq , the bit and phase basis states of
[X⊤, Y ⊤, Z⊤]⊤ are denoted by∣∣∣∣∣∣

XY
Z

〉
b
:=

|X〉b|Y 〉b
|Z〉b

 ,
∣∣∣∣∣∣

XY
Z

〉
p
:=

|X〉p|Y 〉p
|Z〉p

 .
The k× l zero matrix is denoted by 0k,l, and |i, j〉 := |i〉⊗|j〉.
D. CSS code in our quantum network code
In this subsection, we define a Calderbank–Steane–Shor
(CSS) code [21]–[23] which is used in the construction of our
quantum network code in Section V. A CSS code is defined
from two classical codes C1 and C2 satisfying C1 ⊃ C⊥2 ,
where a classical code is defined as the set of codewords.
Therefore, in order to define the CSS code used in our code, we
define the following two classical codes: by identifying the set
F
m0×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ of matrices with the vector space F
m0(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ ,
the classical codes C1, C2 ⊂ Fm0×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ are defined by
C1 :=



0m1,n′ℓ−2m0Y
Z

 ∈ Fm0×(n′ℓ−2m0)q′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Y ∈ F(m0−2m1)×(n′ℓ−2m0)q′ , Z ∈ Fm1×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′

,
C2 :=



 XY
0m1,n′ℓ−2m0

 ∈ Fm0×(n′ℓ−2m0)q′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
X ∈ Fm1×(n′ℓ−2m0)q′ , Y ∈ F(m0−2m1)×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′

.
The classical codes C1 and C2 satisfy C1 ⊃ C⊥2 =
{[0⊤m1,n′ℓ−2m0,0
⊤
m0−2m1,n′ℓ−2m0
, Z⊤]⊤ | Z ∈ Fm1×(n′ℓ−2m0)q′ }.
For any coset M + C⊥2 ∈ C1/C⊥2 containing M ∈
F
(m0−2m1)×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ , define a quantum state |M+C⊥2 〉b ∈ H′C
by
|M + C⊥2 〉b :=
1√
|C⊥2 |
∑
J∈C⊥
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣

0m1,n′ℓ−2m0M
0m1,n′ℓ−2m0

+ J
〉
b
=

|0m1,n′ℓ−2m0〉b|M〉b
|0m1,n′ℓ−2m0〉p

 .
Then, the CSS code is defined as CSS(C1, C2) := {|M +
C⊥2 〉b | M ∈ F(m0−2m1)×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ }. That is, any state |φ〉 ∈
H(nℓ)code := H′C2 = (H′)⊗(m0−2m1)×(n
′
ℓ−2m0) is encoded as
|0m1,n′ℓ−2m0〉b|φ〉
|0m1,n′ℓ−2m0〉p

 ∈ spanCSS(C1, C2) ⊂ H′C .
The above CSS code is used in our code construction.
E. Other Notations
In correspondence with the notations in Section IV-C, for
any positive integer k and any matrix X ∈ Fk×n′ℓq′ , we denote
X = [XA, XB, XC ] ∈ Fk×m0q′ × Fk×m0q′ × Fk×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ .
If k = m0, for any X ∈ {A,B, C}, we denote XX =
[(XX1)⊤, (XX2)⊤, (XX3)⊤]⊤, where XX1, XX3 ∈ Fm1×m0q′
and XX2 ∈ F(m0−2m1)×(n′ℓ−2m0q′ ).
PrR[A(R)] denotes the probability that the random variable
R satisfies the condition A, and PrR[A(R)|B(R)] denotes
7the conditional probability that the variable R satisfies the
condition A under the condition B.
V. CODE CONSTRUCTION WITH NEGLIGIBLE RATE
SECRET SHARED RANDOMNESS
Now, we describe our quantum network code with the secret
shared randomness of negligible rate by nℓ network uses.
In our code, the encoder and decoder are determined
depending on secret randomnesses. Let Re be the set of
m0 ×m0 invertible matrices over Fq′ , R1 be the finite field
Fq′ , and R2 be the set of (m0 − m1) × m0 matrices over
Fq′ of rank m0 − m1. The private randomness Re of the
encoder is uniformly chosen from Re. The secret shared
randomness Rs := (S,R2) := ((S1, . . . , S4m0), (R2,b, R2,p))
between the encoder and decoder is uniformly chosen from
Rs := R4m01 × R22. Note that the size of the shared secret
randomness Rs is less than logq |F4m0q′ × F2(m0−m1)×m0q′ | =
αℓ(2m
2
0+(4−2m1)m0) and therefore negligible with respect
to nℓ.
The code space is H(nℓ)code := H′C2 =
(H′)⊗(m0−2m1)×(n′ℓ−2m0) which is the code space of
the CSS code defined in Section IV-D. The encoder E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
is defined depending on Re and Rs as an isometry quantum
channel from H(nℓ)code to H⊗m0×nℓ , and the decoder D(nℓ)Rs is
defined depending on Rs as a TP-CP map from H⊗m0×nℓ to
H(nℓ)code. In the following subsections, we give the details of
the encoder E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
and the decoder D
(nℓ)
Rs
.
A. Encoder E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
For any input state |φ〉 ∈ H(nℓ)code, the encoder E(nℓ)Re,Rs is
described as follows.
Encode 1 (Check Bit Embedding) Encode the in-
put state |φ〉 by an isometry map UR21 : H(nℓ)code →
(H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ = H′A ⊗H′B ⊗H′C which is defined as
|φ1〉 := UR21 |φ〉
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣

0m1,m0
R2,b

〉
b
⊗
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 R2,p
0m1,m0

〉
p
⊗

|0m1,n′ℓ−2m0〉b|φ〉
|0m1,n′ℓ−2m0〉p

.
Encode 2 (Vertical Mixing) Encode |φ1〉 as
|φ2〉 := L′(Re)|φ1〉 ∈ (H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ .
Encode 3 (Horizontal Mixing) From the shared random-
ness S, define matrices Q1;i,j := (Sj)
i, Q2;i,j := (Sm0+j)
i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n′ℓ− 2m0, 1 ≤ j ≤ m0, and Q3;i,j :=
(S2m0+j)
i, Q4;i,j := (S3m0+j)
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m0 and
1 ≤ j ≤ m0. With these matrices, define a random matrix
RS1 ∈ Fn
′
ℓ×n
′
ℓ
q′ as
RS1 :=

 Im0 0m0,m0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m0Q⊤3 +Q4 Im0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m0
0n′
ℓ
−2m0,m0 0n′ℓ−2m0,m0
In′
ℓ
−2m0


·

 Im0 0m0,m0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m00m0,m0 Im0 Q⊤2
0n′
ℓ
−2m0,m0 0n′ℓ−2m0,m0
In′
ℓ
−2m0


·

 Im0 0m0,m0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m00m0,m0 Im0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m0
Q1 0n′
ℓ
−2m0,m0 In′ℓ−2m0

 ,
where Id is the d-dimensional identity matrix.
Encode |φ2〉 as
|φ3〉 := R′(RS1 )|φ2〉 ∈ (H′)⊗m0×n
′
ℓ .
By the above three steps, the encoder E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
is written as
the isometry map
E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
: |φ〉 7→ R′(RS1 )L′(Re)UR21 |φ〉 ∈ H⊗m0×nℓ .
B. Decoder D
(nℓ)
Rs
For any input state |ψ〉 ∈ (H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ = H⊗m0×nℓ , the
decoder D
(nℓ)
Rs
is described as follows.
Decode 1 (Decoding of Encode 3) The inverse of RS1
is derived from the shared randomness S as
(RS1 )
−1 :=

 Im0 0m0,m0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m00m0,m0 Im0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m0−Q1 0n′
ℓ
−2m0,m0 In′ℓ−2m0


·

 Im0 0m0,m0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m00m0,m0 Im0 −Q⊤2
0n′
ℓ
−2m0,m0 0n′ℓ−2m0,m0
In′
ℓ
−2m0


·

 Im0 0m0,m0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m0−Q⊤3 −Q4 Im0 0m0,n′ℓ−2m0
0n′
ℓ
−2m0,m0 0n′ℓ−2m0,m0
In′
ℓ
−2m0

.
Apply R′(RS1 )
† = R′((RS1 )
−1) to the state |ψ〉:
|ψ1〉 := R′(RS1 )†|ψ〉 ∈ (H′)⊗m0×n
′
ℓ = H′A ⊗H′B ⊗H′C .
Decode 2 (Error Correction) Perform the bit basis
measurement {|Ob〉b | Ob ∈ Fm0×m0q′ } on H′A and the
phase basis measurement {|Op〉p | Op ∈ Fm0×m0q′ } on H′B .
The bit and phase measurement outcomes are denoted as
Ob, Op ∈ Fm0×m0q′ , respectively.
Next, find invertible matrices Db, Dp ∈ Fm0×m0q′ which
satisfy
PbDbOb =
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
, (20)
Pp[Dp]pOp =
[
R2,p
0m1,m0
]
, (21)
8where Pb is the projection to the last m0−m1 elements in
F
m0
q′ and Pp is the projection to the first m0−m1 elements
in Fm0q′ . If the invertible matrix Db or Dp does not exist, the
decoder applies no operation and returns the transmission
failure. If Db or Dp is not unique, the decoder decides Db
or Dp deterministically depending on Ob, R2,b, Op, R2,p.
Finally, apply L′(Db) and L
′(Dp) to the system H′C , and
output the reduced state on H′C2 = H(nℓ)code.
Decode 2 is summarized as a TP-CP map D2 from H′A⊗
H′B ⊗H′C to H(nℓ)code by
D2(|ψ1〉〈ψ1|)
:= Tr
C1,C3
∑
Ob,Op∈F
m0×m0
q′
D
R2,Ob,Op
3 ρOb,Op,|ψ1〉(D
R2,Ob,Op
3 )
†,
where the matrix ρOb,Op,|ψ1〉 and the unitary D
R2,Ob,Op
3 are
defined as
ρOb,Op,|ψ1〉 := Tr
A,B
|ψ1〉〈ψ1|(|Ob〉bb〈Ob| ⊗ |Op〉pp〈Op| ⊗ IC),
D
R2,Ob,Op
3 := L
′(Dp)L
′(Db).
By the above two steps, the decoder D
(nℓ)
Rs
is written as the
TP-CP map
D
(nℓ)
Rs
(|ψ〉〈ψ|) = D2
(
R
′(RS1 )
†|ψ〉〈ψ|R′(RS1 )
)
.
The performance of our code will be analyzed in Section VI.
VI. ANALYSIS OF OUR CODE
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the code
in Section V. That is, we show that the code in Section V
satisfies the conditions (10), (11), and (12) in Theorem III.1.
First, we evaluate the size of the secret shared randomness
and the rate of the code. The size of the secret shared
randomness Rs is less than logq |F4m0q′ × F2(m0−m1)×m0q′ | =
αℓ(2m
2
0+(4−2m1)m0) which does not scale with the block-
length nℓ. Therefore, the secret shared randomness is negli-
gible, i.e., the condition (10) is satisfied. Moreover, since the
dimension of the code spaceH(nℓ)code is (q′)(m0−2m1)(n
′
ℓ−2m0) =
q(m0−2m1)(nℓ−2m0αℓ), the rate of our code is m0− 2m1, i.e.,
the condition (11) is satisfied.
Next, we evaluate the correctability of the code. That is, we
show that our code satisfies the condition (12), i.e.,
lim
ℓ→∞
max
(F ,Snℓ)
nℓ(1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ)) = 0.
Recall that the averaged protocol is written in (8) as
Λnℓ = Λ[Cnℓ ,Fnℓ , Snℓ ](ρ)
=
1
|Rs ×Re|
∑
(rs,re)∈Rs×Re
D
(nℓ)
rs ◦ Γ[Fnℓ , Snℓ ] ◦ E(nℓ)rs,re(ρ),
and the entanglement fidelity is written in (9) as
F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ) = 〈Φ|Λnℓ ⊗ ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)|Φ〉.
Here, the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 is written as |Φ〉 :=(
1/(q′)
m/2)∑
x∈Fm
q′
|x, x〉b for m := (m0 − 2m1)(n′ℓ−2m0)
since H(nℓ)code = (H′)m. The entanglement fidelity is evaluated
by
1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ) (22)
=1− 〈Φ|Λnℓ ⊗ ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)|Φ〉
=TrΛnℓ ⊗ ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)(I − P1P2) (23)
≤TrΛnℓ⊗ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)(I−P1)+TrΛnℓ⊗ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)(I−P2) (24)
for P1 :=
∑
x∈Fm
q′
|x, x〉bb〈x, x| and P2 :=∑
z∈Fm
q′
|z, z¯〉pp〈z, z¯| where |z¯〉p is the complex conjugate of
|z〉p. The equality of (23) holds from P1P2 = |Φ〉〈Φ| which
is proved in Lemma B.2.
The two terms in (24) are error probabilities with respect
to the bit and phase bases, respectively, in the following
sense. Define the bit error probability of Λnℓ as the average
probability that a bit basis state |x〉b ∈ H(nℓ)code is the input state
of Λnℓ but the bit basis measurement outcome on the output
state is not x. Since the bit error probability is evaluated as
(bit error probability)
= 1− 1
(q′)
m
∑
x∈Fm
q′
b〈x|Λnℓ(|x〉bb〈x|)|x〉b
= 1− 1
(q′)
m
∑
x∈Fm
q′
TrP1 ·(Λnℓ⊗ιR(|x,x〉bb〈x,x|))
= TrΛnℓ ⊗ ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)(I − P1),
the bit error probability is equal to the first term of (24).
Similarly, the second term TrΛnℓ ⊗ ιR(|Φ〉〈Φ|)(I − P2) of
(24) is the phase error probability of Λnℓ which is the average
probability that a phase basis state is the input of Λnℓ but
the phase basis measurement outcome on output is incorrect.
Therefore, we can bound the entanglement fidelity as
1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ)
≤ (bit error probability)+ (phase error probability). (25)
The bit and phase error probabilities of our code are evalu-
ated by the following lemma, which is proved in Section VII.
Lemma VI.1. Let Cn be the quantum network code con-
structed in Section V and suppose that the randomness Rs
of Cn is shared secretly between the encoder and decoder.
For any (F , Snℓ) ∈ ζ(nℓ)m0,m1 defined in (6), the bit and phase
error probabilities of Λ[Cnℓ ,Fnℓ , Snℓ ] are evaluated as
(bit error probability)≤O
(
max
{ 1
q′
,
(n′ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
})
, (26)
(phase error probability)≤O
(
max
{ 1
q′
,
(n′ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
})
. (27)
By combining Eq. (25) and Lemma VI.1, we have the
following inequality:
max
(F ,Snℓ)
1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ) ≤ O
(
max
{
1
q′
,
(n′ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
})
.
From the condition (18), and since the condition (18) implies
limℓ→∞ nℓ/q
′ = 0, the condition (12) is satisfied.
To summarize, the code in Section V satisfies the conditions
(10), (11), and (12) in Theorem III.1. Thus, Theorem III.1 is
proved.
9VII. BIT AND PHASE ERROR PROBABILITIES
In this section, we prove Lemma VI.1, that is, we bound
separately the bit and phase error probabilities of Λnℓ .
A. Lemmas for derivation of bit and phase error probabilities
Before we prove Lemma VI.1, we prepare three lemmas.
The first lemma is a variant of [16, Lemma 5].
Lemma VII.1. Let V be a vector space, and W1 and W2 be
subspaces of V . Suppose the following two conditions (A) and
(B) hold.
(A) W1 ∩W2 = {0}.
(B) n0 vectors u1 + v1, . . . , un0 + vn0 ∈ W1 ⊕W2 span the
subspace W1 ⊕W2.
Then, the following two statements hold.
(C) LetW3 be a subspace of V such that dimW3 = dimW1.
For any bijective linear map A from W1 to W3, there
exists an invertible matrix D on V such that
PW3D(ui + vi) = Aui (∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n0}), (28)
where PW3 is the projection to the subspace W3.
(D) For any u+ v ∈ W1⊕W2, any matrix D satisfying (28)
satisfies
PW3D(u+ v) = Au. (29)
Proof. From the condition (A), there exists an invertible ma-
trix D on V such that Du = Au ∈ W3 and Dv ∈ W⊥3 for any
u ∈ W1 and v ∈ W2. Then, the map D satisfies (28), which
implies the condition (C). Moreover, the condition (B) guar-
antees that the condition (C) implies the condition (D).
In addition, we also prepare the following two lemmas.
Lemma VII.2. For any positive integers n0 ≥ n1+n2, fix an
n0-dimensional vector space V over Fq and an n1-dimensional
subspace W ⊂ V , and let R be the set of n2-dimensional
subspaces of V . When the choice ofR ∈ R follows the uniform
distribution, we have
Pr[W ∩R = {0}] = 1−O(qn1+n2−n0−1),
where the big-O notation is with respect to the prime power
q which goes to infinity.
Proof. The probability Pr[W ∩ R = {0}] is the same as
the probability to choose n2 linearly independent vectors so
that they do not intersect with W , which is done by the
following method: choose v1 from V \ W , and for each i ∈
{1, . . . , n2−1}, choose vi+1 from V \(W⊕span{v1, . . . , vi})
by the mathematical induction. Therefore, we have
Pr[W ∩R = {0}]
=
[qn0 − qn1
qn0
]
·
[qn0 − qn1+1
qn0 − q1
]
· · · · ·
[qn0 − qn1+n2−1
qn0 − qn2−1
]
= 1−O(qn1+n2−n0−1).
Lemma VII.3. For any positive integer n′ℓ > 3m0,
max
x 6=0n′
ℓ
,1
PrS
[
x⊤((RS1 )
−1)A=01,m0
]≤(n′ℓ−2m0
q′
)m0
, (30)
max
x 6=0n′
ℓ
,1
PrS [x
⊤([RS1 ]
−1
p )
B=01,m0 ] ≤
(n′ℓ−2m0
q′
)m0
, (31)
where the maximum is with respect to any nonzero vector x ∈
F
nℓ
q′ , and the random variable S = (S1, . . . , S4m0) and the
matrix RS1 are defined in Section V.
The proof of Lemma VII.3 is given in Appendix C.
B. The analysis of protocol after bit basis measurement
Before we prove the upper bound (26) for the bit error
probability, we analyze the protocol when any bit basis state
|M〉b ∈ H(nℓ)code is the input state of the code. In the following,
the parameter (F , Snℓ) ∈ ζ(nℓ)m0,m1 for the network operation is
fixed but arbitrary.
In this case, the sender sends E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
(|M〉bb〈M |) over the
network, and the receiver receives the state Γ[Fnℓ , Snℓ ] ◦
E
(nℓ)
Re,Rs
(|M〉bb〈M |) on H⊗m0×nℓ = (H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ , where
Γ[Fnℓ , Snℓ ] is defined in (5). The receiver applies the decoder
D
(nℓ)
Rs
and, finally, performs the bit basis measurement to the
output state of the decoder.
Note that the bit basis measurement to the output state of the
decoder commutes with the decoding operation D
(nℓ)
Rs
. That is,
the process of applying the quantum decoder D
(nℓ)
Rs
and then
performing the bit basis measurement on H(nℓ)code is equivalent
to the process of performing the bit basis measurement on
(H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ and then applying the classical decoding which
corresponds to the quantum decoder D
(nℓ)
Rs
. Therefore, we
adopt the latter method to calculate the bit error probability.
Let Y ∈ Fm0×n′ℓq′ be the outcome of the bit basis measure-
ment on (H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ = H′A ⊗ H′B ⊗ H′C . From Eq. (3), the
matrix Y is written as
Y = K˜X ′ + W˜ , (32)
where K˜ ∈ Fm0×m0q′ and W˜ ∈ Fm0×n
′
ℓ
q′ are matrices equivalent
to K ∈ Fm0×m0q and WZ ∈ Fm0×nℓq in (3) by field extension,
respectively, and X ′ := ReXR
S
1 ∈ Fm0×n
′
ℓ
q′ for X ∈ Fm0×n
′
ℓ
q′
defined with some matrices E¯1 ∈ F(m0−m1)×m0q′ , E¯2 ∈
F
m1×m0
q′ , and E¯3 ∈ Fm1×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ by
X :=



0m1,m0
R2,b

 ,

E¯1
E¯2

 ,

0m1,n′ℓ−2m0M
E¯3



 . (33)
By Decode 1, the matrix Y is decoded as
Y1 := Y (R
S
1 )
−1 = (K˜ReX + W˜ (R
S
1 )
−1).
Since the bit measurement outcome Ob in Decode 2 is
Y A1 = (Y (R
S
1 )
−1)A = Y ((RS1 )
−1)A, the equation (20) is
written as
PbDb
(
K˜Re
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
+W˜ ((RS1 )
−1)A
)
=
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
. (34)
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By Decode 2, the matrix Y1 is decoded as
Y2 := DbY1 = Db(K˜ReX + W˜ (R
S
1 )
−1).
Though the decoding succeeds if Y C22 = M , we evaluate
instead the probability that PbY
C
2 = [0
⊤
m1,n′ℓ−2m0
,M⊤, E¯⊤3 ]
⊤
holds. In other words, since PbY
C
2 is written as
PbY
C
2 = PbDbY ((R
S
1 )
−1)C
= PbDb

K˜Re

0m1,n′ℓ−2m0M
E¯3

+ W˜ ((RS1 )−1)C

, (35)
we evaluate the probability of
PbDb

K˜Re

0m1,n′ℓ−2m0M
E¯3

+W˜ ((RS1 )−1)C

=

0m1,n′ℓ−2m0M
E¯3

. (36)
Then, the decoding success probability is lower bounded by
the probability that (36) holds.
C. Upper bound of bit error probability
In this subsection, we derive the upper bound (26) for the
bit error probability in Lemma VI.1.
Apply Lemma VII.1 to the following case:
V := Fm0q′ , W1 := Im K˜Re|Wb , (37)
W2 := Im W˜ , W3 :=Wb, A = (K˜Re|Wb)−1
[u1 + v1, . . . , um0 + vm0 ] := K˜Re
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
+W˜ ((RS1 )
−1)A,
where Wb is the image of the projection Pb defined in (20).
Let (A’), (B’), (C’), and (D’) be the conditions (A), (B), (C),
and (D) of Lemma VII.1 for this allocation, respectively. If the
conditions (A’) and (B’) hold, the condition (C’) implies that
the equation (34) has the solution Db. Moreover, it is clear
from (D’) that Eq. (36) holds, which implies there is no error
in the protocol. Therefore, we have the inequality
PrRe,Rs [(A’) ∩ (B’)] ≤ 1− (bit error probability), (38)
where the probability of (A’) depends on the random vari-
able Re and that of (B’) depends on random variables Re
and Rs = (S,R2). That is, the evaluation of the bit error
probability is reduced to the evaluation of the probability that
both conditions (A’) and (B’) hold.
In the remainder of this subsection, we will prove the
following lemma.
Lemma VII.4. The following inequalities holds:
PrRe [(A’)] ≥ 1−O
(
1
q′
)
, (39)
PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(A’)] ≥ 1−O
(
max
{ 1
q′
,
(n′ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
})
. (40)
Then, by combining the inequality (38) with Lemma VII.4,
we obtain the desired upper bound (26) for the bit error
probability.
1) Proof of lower bound (39) for PrRe [(A’)]: Apply
Lemma VII.2 to the case V := Fm0q′ , W := Im W˜ , and
R := Im K˜Re|Wb . In this case, we have n1 = rank W˜ ≤
rankWZ ≤ rankW ≤ ma ≤ m1 and n2 = rank K˜Re|Wb =
m0 − m1. Therefore, Lemma VII.2 implies the desired in-
equality (39).
2) Proof of lower bound (40) for PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(A’)]: We
derive the lower bound (40) for PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(A’)], by three
steps. In the following, we assume the condition (A’).
Step 1: First, we give one necessary condition for (B’)
and calculate the probability that the necessary condition is
satisfied. The condition (B’) is equivalent to
rank
(
K˜Re
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
+ W˜ ((RS1 )
−1)A
)
(41)
= rankR2,b + rank W˜ , (42)
On the other hand, the following inequality holds from
rank(A + B) ≤ rankA + rankB and rank(AB) ≤
min{rankA, rankB} for any matrices A and B:
rank
(
K˜Re
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
+ W˜ ((RS1 )
−1)A
)
(43)
≤ rankR2,b + rank W˜ ((RS1 )−1)A
≤ rankR2,b + rank W˜ , (44)
Therefore, the following condition is a necessary condition for
(B’):
rank W˜ ((RS1 )
−1)A = rank W˜ . (45)
The condition (45) holds if and only if x⊤W˜ ((RS1 )
−1)A 6=
01,m0 holds for any x ∈ Fm0q′ such that x⊤W˜ 6= 0n′ℓ,1. Apply
Lemma VII.3 to all (q′)rank W˜ vectors in {x⊤W˜ 6= 0n′
ℓ
,1 |
x ∈ Fm0q′ }, and then we have
PrS [(45)|(A’)] ≥ 1− (q′)rank W˜
(
n′ℓ−2m0
q′
)m0
≥ 1− (q′)m1
(
n′ℓ−2m0
q′
)m0
≥ 1− (n
′
ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
. (46)
Step 2: In this step, we evaluate the conditional probability
that (B’) holds under the conditions (A’) and (45), i.e.,
PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(45) ∩ (A’)].
Recall that the vectors uk, vk ∈ Fm0q′ for k = 1, . . . ,m0 are
defined by (37) as
[u1, . . . , um0 ] = K˜Re
[
0m1,m0
R2,b
]
,
[v1, . . . , vm0 ] = W˜ ((R
S
1 )
−1)A.
Let m2 := rankR2,b + rank W˜ . Define an injective in-
dex function i : {1, ...,m0} → {1, ...,m0} such that
rank(vi(1), . . . , vi(m2)) = rank W˜ . Note that the condition
(B’) holds if the m2 vectors ui(1) + vi(1), . . . , ui(m2) + vi(m2)
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are linearly independent. Moreover, the condition (A’) guar-
antees that the m2 vectors ui(1) + vi(1), . . . , ui(m2) + vi(m2)
are linearly independent if the following condition holds:
S⊥u ∩ S⊥v = {0m2,1}, (47)
where
S⊥u :=
{
x ∈ Fm2q′
∣∣∣ [ui(1), . . . , ui(m2)]x = 0m0,1},
S⊥v :=
{
x ∈ Fm2q′
∣∣∣ [vi(1), . . . , vi(m2)]x = 0m0,1}.
That is, we have the inequality
PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(45) ∩ (A’)] ≥ PrRe,Rs [(47)|(45) ∩ (A’)]. (48)
Then, we evaluate the probability that (47) holds. It follows
from the definitions of vectors u1, . . . , um0 , v1, . . . , vm0 and
the index function i that
dimS⊥u ≥ m2 − rank[ui(1), . . . , ui(m2)] ≥ rank W˜ ,
dimS⊥v = m2 − rank[vi(1), . . . , vi(m2)] = rankR2,b.
This implies dimS⊥u +dimS⊥v ≥ m2, and therefore (47) holds
only if
dimS⊥u = rank W˜ . (49)
We calculate the conditional probability that (47) holds by the
following relation:
PrRe,Rs [(47)|(45) ∩ (A’)]
= PrRe,Rs [(47)|(49) ∩ (45) ∩ (A’)]
· PrRe,Rs [(49) ∩ (45) ∩ (A’)]. (50)
Applying Lemma VII.2 with (n0,W ,R) := (m2,S⊥v ,S⊥u ),
we have
PrRe,Rs [(47)|(49) ∩ (45) ∩ (A’)] = 1−O
(
1
q′
)
. (51)
Moreover, the following inequality is proved in Appendix D:
PrRe,Rs [(49)∩(45)∩(A’)]≥1−O
(
1
q′
)
. (52)
Finally, combining the inequalities (48), (50), (51), and (52),
we have the inequality
PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(45) ∩ (A’)] ≥ PrRe,Rs [(47)|(45) ∩ (A’)]
≥ 1−O
(
1
q′
)
. (53)
Step 3: From the two inequalities (46) and (53), the
probability PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(A’)] is evaluated as
PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(A’)]
= PrRe,Rs [(B’) ∩ (45)|(A’)]
= PrRe,Rs [(B’)|(45) ∩ (A’)] · PrRe,Rs [(45)|(A’)]
≥
(
1−O
(
1
q′
))(
1− (n
′
ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
)
= 1−O
(
max
{ 1
q′
,
(n′ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
})
.
Thus, we obtain the inequality (40).
D. Phase error probability
Since Lemma IV.1 implies that coding and node operations
are considered as classical linear operations even in the phase
basis, we can apply similar analysis to the phase basis trans-
mission as in Sections VII-B and VII-C.
Consider the situation that any phase basis state |M〉p ∈
H(nℓ)code is encoded and transmitted through the quantum net-
work. In the same way as the bit basis states, we analyze the
case that the receiver performs the phase basis measurement
on (H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ first, and then applies the decoding operations.
After the phase basis measurement on (H′)⊗m0×n′ℓ , the mea-
surement outcome Y ∈ Fm0×n′ℓq′ is written similarly to (32)
as
Y := [K˜Re]pZ[R
S
1 ]p + W˜
′,
where W˜ ′ ∈ Fm0×n′ℓq′ is a matrix such that rank W˜ ′ ≤ m1 and
Z :=



E¯′1
E¯′2

 ,

 R2,p
0m1,m0

 ,

 E¯′3M
0m1,n′ℓ−2m0



 ∈ Fm0×n′ℓq′
for some matrices E¯′1 ∈ Fm1×m0q′ , E¯′2 ∈ F(m0−m1)×m0q′ , and
E¯′3 ∈ Fm1×(n
′
ℓ−2m0)
q′ . By the decoder, the matrix Y is decoded
as
Y2 := [Dp]p
(
[K˜Re]pZ + W˜
′[(RS1 )
−1]p
)
.
Consider applying Lemma VII.1 in the following case:
V := Fm0q′ , W1 := Im[K˜Re]p|Wp , (54)
W2 := Im[W˜ ]p, W3 :=Wp, A = ([K˜Re]p|Wp)−1
[u1+v1, . . . , um0+vm0 ] := [K˜Re]p
[
R2,p
0m1,m0
]
+[W˜ ]p[(R
S
1 )
−1]Ap ,
where Wp is the image of the projection Pp defined in (20).
Let (A”), (B”), (C”), and (D”) be the conditions (A), (B), (C),
and (D) of Lemma VII.1 for this allocation, respectively. From
Lemma VII.1, if the conditions (A”) and (B”) hold, there is no
error in the protocol after the phase basis measurement. That
is, we have the relation
PrRe,Rs [(A”) ∩ (B”)] ≤ 1− (phase error probability). (55)
Moreover, by exactly the same way as in Sections VII-C1 and
VII-C2, we have
PrRe [(A”)] ≥ 1−O
(
1
q′
)
, (56)
PrRe,Rs [(B”)|(A”)] ≥ 1−O
(
max
{ 1
q′
,
(n′ℓ)
m0
(q′)m0−m1
})
. (57)
Therefore, by combining inequalities (55), (56) and (57), we
obtain the upper bound (27) of the phase error probability in
Lemma VI.1.
VIII. SECURE QUANTUM NETWORK CODE WITHOUT
CLASSICAL COMMUNICATION
In the secure quantum network code given in Theorem III.1,
we assumed that the encoder and decoder share the negligible
rate randomness Rs secretly. The secret shared randomness
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can be realized by secure communication. The paper [15]
provided a secure classical communication protocol for the
classical network as Proposition VIII.1.
Proposition VIII.1 ( [15, Theorem 1]). Consider a classical
network where each channel transmits an element of the finite
field Fq and each node performs a linear operation. Let the
inequality c1 + c2 < c0 holds for the transmission rate c0
from Alice to Bob, the rate c1 of the noise injected by Eve,
and the rate c2 of the information leakage to Eve. For any
positive integer β, there exists a k-bit transmission protocol
by n2 := kβc0(c0 − c2 + 1) uses of the network such that
Perr ≤ k c0
qβc0
and I(M ;E) = 0,
where Perr is the error probability and I(M ;E) is the mutual
information between the message M ∈ Fk2 and the Eve’s
information E.
By attaching the protocol of Proposition VIII.1 as a quantum
protocol, we can share the negligible rate randomness secretly
as the following proof of Theorem III.2.
Proof of Theorem III.2. Since the protocol of Proposition
VIII.1 can be implemented with the quantum network by
sending bit basis states instead of classical bits, the following
code satisfies the conditions of Theorem III.2.
In the same way as (17), we choose αℓ := ⌊5 logq ℓ⌋,
n′ℓ,1 := ⌊ℓ/αℓ⌋, nℓ,1 := αn′ℓ,1, q′ := qαℓ for any sufficiently
large ℓ such that αℓ > 0 and n
′
ℓ,1 > 3m0. For the imple-
mentation of the code given in Section V with the block-
length nℓ,1 and the extended field of size q
′, the sender and
receiver need to share the secret randomness which consists of
4m0+2m0(m0−m1) elements of Fq′ . Hence, using the pro-
tocol of Proposition VIII.1 with (c0, c1, c2) := (m0,m1,m1),
the sender secretly sends k = ⌈(4m0+2m0(m0−m1)) log2 q′⌉
bits to the receiver, which is called the preparation protocol.
To guarantee that the error of the preparation protocol goes to
zero, we choose β = ⌊2 logq log2 ℓ⌋. Since k is evaluated as
k = ⌈(4m0+2m0(m0−m1)) log2 q′⌉ = ⌈(4m0+2m0(m0−
m1))⌊5 logq ℓ⌋ log2 q⌉ ≤ ⌈5(4m0 + 2m0(m0 − m1)) log2 ℓ⌉,
we have Perr ≤ O(log2 ℓ/(log2 ℓ)2) → 0. Also, the prepara-
tion protocol requires nℓ,2 = kβm0(m0 −m1 + 1) network
uses. Finally, we apply the code given in Theorem III.1 with
the block-length nℓ,1 and the above chosen αℓ and q
′.
The block-length of this code is nℓ = nℓ,1 + nℓ,2. Since
nℓ,1 = Θ(ℓ) and
nℓ,2 ≤ m0(m0 −m1 + 1)⌈5(4m0 + 2m0(m0 −m1)) log2 ℓ⌉
· ⌊2 logq log2 ℓ⌋,
we have nℓ,2/nℓ → 0 and nℓ,1/nℓ → 1. Therefore, Theo-
rem III.1 guarantees the conditions (14) and (15), and this code
do not assume any shared randomness, i.e, (13) is satisfied.
Thus, this code realizes the required conditions.
IX. SECRECY OF OUR CODE
In this section, we show that the condition (12) in Theo-
rem III.1 and (15) in Theorem III.2, i.e.,
lim
ℓ→∞
max
(F ,Snℓ)
nℓ(1− F 2e (ρmix,Λnℓ)) = 0,
guarantees the secrecy of the code. The leaked information
of a quantum protocol κ is upper bounded by entropy ex-
change He(ρ, κ) := H(κ ⊗ ιR(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)) = H(κE(ρ)) as
follows, where |ϕ〉 is a purification of the state ρ, ιR is
the identity channel to the reference system, and κE is the
channel to the environment. When the input state ρx is
generated subject to the distribution px, the mutual informa-
tion between the input system and the environment is given
as H(κE(
∑
x pxρx)) −
∑
x pxH(κE(ρx)), which is upper
bounded by He(κ,
∑
x pxρx). On the other hand, the entropy
exchange is upper bounded by the entanglement fidelity as
[17]
He(ρ, κ) ≤ h(F 2e (ρ, κ)) + (1− F 2e (ρ, κ)) log(d− 1)2, (58)
where h(p) is the binary entropy defined as h(p) := p log p+
(1 − p) log(1 − p) for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and d is the dimension of
the input space of κ. Hence, applying the inequality (58) to
an arbitrary averaged protocol Λnℓ and the completely mixed
state ρmix, because d = dimH(nℓ)code = O
(
q(m0−2m1)nℓ
)
in our
code, the condition (12) leads that the entropy exchange of the
averaged protocol is asymptotically 0, i.e., there is no leakage
in the averaged protocol. Thus, the asymptotic correctability
(12) also guarantees the secrecy of the code in Theorems III.1
and III.2.
X. CONCLUSION
We have presented an asymptotically secret and correctable
quantum network code as a quantum extension of the clas-
sical network codes given in [13], [16]. To introduce our
code, the network is constrained that the node operations
are invertible linear operations to the basis states. When the
transmission rate of a given network is m0 without attack and
the maximum number of attacked channels is m1, by multiple
uses of the network, our code achieves the rate m0 − 2m1
asymptotically without any classical communication. Our code
needs a negligible rate secret shared randomness but it is
implemented by attaching a known secure classical network
communication protocol [15] to our quantum network code. In
the analysis of the code, we only considered the correctability
because the secrecy is guaranteed by the correctness of the
code protocol. The correctability is derived analogously to the
classical network codes [13], [16] but by evaluating the bit
and phase error probabilities separately.
One remaining task is to show whether our code rate
m0 − 2m1 is optimal or not. As a first step to discuss this
problem, we may consider the quantum capacity when the
network topology, node operations, andm1 corrupted channels
are fixed. This problem is remained as a future study.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA IV.1
Proof of Lemma IV.1. For any x = (x1, ..., xm), y =
(y1, ..., ym) ∈ Fmq , define an inner product
(x, y) :=
m∑
i=1
trxiyi = tr
m∑
i=1
xiyi, (59)
where tr is defined in Section IV-A. Let T be a m×m matrix
on Fq . If x, y are considered as column vectors, it holds that
(Tx, y) = (x, T⊤y). On the other hand, if x, y are considered
as row vectors, it holds that (xT, y) = (x, yT⊤).
First, we show L(A)|Z〉p = |(A−1)⊤Z〉p by considering Fmq
as a column vector space. For L(1)(A) :=
∑
x∈Fmq
|Ax〉bb〈x|
and z ∈ Fmq , we have
L
(1)(A)|z〉p = 1√
qm
∑
x∈Fmq
ω−(x,z)|Ax〉b
=
1√
qm
∑
x′∈Fmq
ω−(A
−1x′,z)|x′〉b
=
1√
qm
∑
x′∈Fmq
ω−(x
′,(A−1)⊤z)|x′〉b
= |(A−1)⊤z〉p.
Since L(A) =
(
L(1)(A)
)⊗n
, we have L(A)|Z〉p =
|(A−1)⊤Z〉p.
Next, consider Fnq as an n-dimensional row vector space
over Fq . For R
(1)(B) :=
∑
x∈Fnq
|xB〉bb〈x| and z ∈ Fnq , we
have
R
(1)(B)|z〉p = 1√
qn
∑
x∈Fnq
ω−(x,z)|xB〉b
=
1√
qn
∑
x′′∈Fnq
ω−(x
′′B−1,z)|x′′〉b
=
1√
qn
∑
x′′∈Fnq
ω−(x
′′,z(B−1)⊤)|x′′〉b
= |z(B−1)⊤〉p.
Since R(B) =
(
R(1)(B)
)⊗m
, we have R(B)|Z〉p =
|Z(B−1)⊤〉p.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (23)
In this section, we show Lemmas B.1 and B.2 which shows
the relationship between two maximally entangled states and
projections P1, P2 defined by the bit and the phase bases.
Define the following maximally entangled states with re-
spect to the bit and phase bases:
|Φ1〉 := 1√
qm
∑
i∈Fmq
|i, i〉b, |Φ2〉 := 1√
qm
∑
z∈Fmq
|z, z¯〉p.
We use the inner product (·, ·) defined in (59) for the proofs.
Lemma B.1. |Φ1〉 = |Φ2〉.
Proof. The lemma is proved as follows:
|Φ2〉 = 1√
qm
( ∑
z∈Fmq
(∑
j∈Fmq
ω−(z,j)√
qm
|j〉b
)
⊗
(∑
l∈Fmq
ω(z,l)√
qm
|l〉b
))
=
1√
qm
∑
z,j,l∈Fmq
ω−(z,j−l)
qm
|j, l〉b
=
1√
qm
∑
j∈Fmq
|j, j〉b = |Φ1〉, (60)
where the first equality in (60) holds because
∑
z∈Fmq
ω−(z,j−l)
qm
=
{
0 if j 6= l,
1 otherwise.
From the above lemma, we denote |Φ〉 := |Φ1〉 = |Φ2〉.
Eq. (23) is proved by the following lemma.
Lemma B.2. P1P2 = P2P1 = |Φ〉〈Φ|.
Proof. The lemma is proved as follows:
P1P2 =
∑
i,z∈Fmq
b〈i, i|z, z¯〉p|i, i〉bp〈z, z¯|
=
∑
i,z∈Fmq
ω−(z,i−i)
qm
∑
j,l∈Fmq
ω(z,j−l)
qm
|i, i〉bb〈j, l|
=
∑
i,j,l,z∈Fmq
ω(z,j−l)
q2m
|i, i〉bb〈j, l|
=
∑
i,j∈Fmq
1
qm
|i, i〉bb〈j, j| = |Φ〉〈Φ|.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA VII.3
We use the following lemma [13, Claim 5] to prove
Lemma VII.3.
Lemma C.1 ( [13, Claim 5]). Suppose independentm random
variables S1, . . . , Sm ∈ Fq are uniformly chosen in Fq and
define the random matrix Q ∈ Fl×mq as Qi,j := (Sj)i. For
any row vectors x ∈ Fmq and y ∈ Flq\{01,l} (l ≥ m), we have
PrS [x = yQ] ≤
( l
q
)m
. (61)
Now, we prove Lemma VII.3.
Proof of Lemma VII.3. Let x = (xA, xB, xC) ∈ Fm0q′ ×Fm0q′ ×
F
n′ℓ−2m0
q′ be a nonzero row vector. From the definition of R
S
1 ,
we have the relations
x((RS1 )
−1)A = xA − xB(Q⊤3 +Q4)− xCQ1, (62)
x([RS1 ]
−1
p )
B = xB + xA(Q⊤4 +Q3 +Q
⊤
1 Q2) + x
CQ2. (63)
The inequality (30) is proved as follows. The relation
(62) implies that the condition x((RS1 )
−1)A = 01,m0 holds
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in the following cases. In each case, the probability for
x((RS1 )
−1)A = 01,m0 is calculated by Lemma C.1 as follows.
1) If xC 6= 01,n′
ℓ
−2m0 , the inequality (61) for Q := Q1
implies
PrS [x
A − xB(Q⊤3 +Q4) = xCQ1] ≤
(n′ℓ−2m0
q′
)m0
.
2) If xB 6= 01,m0 and xC = 01,n′ℓ−2m0 , the inequality (61)
for Q := Q4 implies
PrS [x
A − xBQ⊤3 = xBQ4] ≤
(m0
q′
)m0
.
3) If xA 6= 01,m0 , xB = 01,m0 , and xC = 01,n′ℓ−2m0 , the
probability that (62) holds is zero.
Since the inequality n′ℓ > 3m0 holds from (19), we have(m0
q′
)m0
<
(n′ℓ − 2m0
q′
)m0
. (64)
Therefore, we obtain the inequality (30) in Lemma VII.3.
Next, we show the inequality (31) as follows. The relation
(63) implies that the condition x([RS1 ]
−1
p )
B = 01,m0 holds
in the following cases. In each case, the probability for
x([RS1 ]
−1
p )
B = 01,m0 is calculated by Lemma C.1 as follows.
1) If xC 6= 01,n′
ℓ
−2m0, the inequality (61) for Q := Q2
implies
PrS [x
B + xA(Q⊤4 +Q3 +Q
⊤
1 Q2) = −xCQ2]
≤
(n′ℓ−2m0
q′
)m0
.
2) If xA 6= 01,m0 and xC = 01,n′ℓ−2m0, the inequality (61)
for Q := Q3 implies
PrS [x
B + xA(Q⊤4 +Q
⊤
1 Q2) = −xAQ3] ≤
(m0
q′
)m0
.
3) If xA = 01,m0 , x
B 6= 01,m0 , and xC = 01,n′ℓ−2m0, the
probability that (63) holds is zero.
Therefore, from the inequality (64), we obtain the inequality
(31) in Lemma VII.3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF (52)
From dimS⊥u = m2 − rank[ui(1), . . . , ui(m2)], we have
Pr
[
dimS⊥u=rankW˜
]
=Pr
[
rank[ui(1),. . .,ui(m2)]=rankR2,b
]
.
Since R2,b = [ui(1), . . . , ui(m0)] is a random matrix with
rankR2,b = m0 −m1, this probability is equivalent to
Pr
[
rank[ui(1), . . . , ui(m2)] = rankR2,b
]
= Pr
[
rank[v1, . . . , vm2 ] = m0 −m1
∣∣
rank[v1, . . . , vm0 ] = m0 −m1, vk ∈ Fm0−m1q′
]
.
Therefore, it holds that
Pr
[
rank[ui(1), . . . , ui(m2)] = rankR2,b
]
≥ Pr
[
rank[v1, . . . , vm2 ] = m0 −m1
∣∣vk ∈ Fm0−m1q′ ]
≥ Pr
[
rank[v1, . . . , vm0−m1 ]=m0−m1
∣∣vk ∈ Fm0−m1q′ ]. (65)
The probability (65) is equivalent to the probability to choose
m0 −m1 independent vectors in Fm0−m1q′ :
Pr
[
rank[v1, . . . , vm0−m1 ] = m0 −m1
∣∣vk ∈ Fm0−m1q′ ]
=
(q′)m0−m1
(q′)m0−m1
· (q
′)m0−m1−q′
(q′)m0−m1
· · · (q
′)m0−m1−(q′)m0−m1−1
(q′)m0−m1
= 1−O
(
1
q′
)
.
Therefore, (52) holds with probability at least 1−O(1/q′).
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